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Abstract: The aim of the study is to investigate the effect of revised Code of Corporate 
Governance 2011 for public companies in Nigeria and how these changes affect the quality of 
financial reporting in the nonfinancial firms in Nigeria between 2010 and 2014. The study 
employed McNichols (2002) accrual quality measure on pooled panel data with 505 firm-year 
observations. The findings revealed that the revised code brought changes that impacted 
positively in providing effective mechanisms for monitoring and control which decreases earnings 
management practices that enhanced the quality of financial reports in Nigerian nonfinancial 
listed firms. However, specific variables contribution in improving the quality of firms’ earnings 
were found to be inadequate in enhancing the quality of financial reports. Thus, mandatory 
disclosure of equity and financial expertise of shareholders representatives on the audit committee 
in the governance reports would improve oversight monitoring functions of the board and audit 
committee. 
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1.1 Introduction 
The global financial crises that resulted in a 
passionate demand for best practices in the 
management of corporations called for the review 
of how public companies are managed in Nigeria. 
The Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA) 1990, as amended in 2004, was saddled 
with the responsibility of providing a corporate 
governance framework for public companies in 
Nigeria (Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad 2015). 
Consequently, three statutory bodies are shoulder 
with the responsibility of regulating accounting and 
financial reporting in Nigeria, which is the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) (2012), 
Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) and Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Nigerian Financial 
Reporting Council (NFRC). The CAC is vested 
with the responsibility of supervising and 
registering company formation, management, and 
winding up. However, SEC handles regulating the 
capital market while the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
is charged with the responsibility of making sure 
that firms comply with listing rules, as well as the 
reporting requirements of the firms. While the 
NFRC established in 2011, is vested with the 
responsibility for developing and publishing 
financial reporting standards for public companies.  
In 2003, SEC developed a code of the best practice 
for public companies in Nigeria. The code was 
made to be voluntary and designed to establish 
good business practice and standard for directors, 
CEOs, Boards, and auditors of listed companies 
(Wilson, 2006). Given the lack of enforcement of 
the SEC, 2003 rules that rendered it ineffective and 
unobservable by the companies (World Bank, 
2004, 2012). Then, SEC set up another review 
committee that was mandated to recommend ways 
of improving the enforcement mechanisms required 
to make CCG 2003 more effective and enforceable. 
The recommendations of the review committee 
gave rise to the release of SEC CCG, 2011. 
Therefore, does the revised CCG, 2011, provides 
significant changes that improve the quality of 
financial reporting in the nonfinancial listed 
companies in Nigeria? This amongst other 
questions is what this study seeks to answer. 
2.1 Materials and Methods 
 The quality of the financial report is 
fundamental to investors, shareholders, 
creditors and other stakeholders which provide 
them with financial information about an entity. 
However, the quality of the report depends on 
its reliability that translates into investment 
decision (Wilson, 2006). Thus, emphasise the 
need to provide relevant information, which is 
crucial for efficient markets, the absence of 
which encouraged market manipulation. 
Accordingly, corporate governance mechanisms 
Financial Reporting Quality, Does Regulatory Changes Matter? Evidence from Nigeria 
 
Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, 4(12) November, 2016 113 
are set to impact positively on the quality of 
earnings, as a result, discourage motivation for 
earnings manipulation. However, the consistent 
reported cases of fraud related cases, distress 
and bankruptcy cases particularly in deposit 
money banks, caused much public concern 
about the quality of firms financial reporting 
(Miko & Kamardin, 2016; Olowokure, Tanko, 
& Nyor, 2016). 
Accordingly, the Code made provisions aim at 
strengthening internal control mechanism through 
the audit committee (AC). Thus, AC is required to 
be established by section 359 (3) and (4) of 
(CAMA) Cap. C20 Law of the Federation of 
Nigeria (LFN) 2004. Where the Board is required 
to nominate three of its members, while three 
members are appointed by the shareholders’ 
making an audit committee of six. Further, at least 
one financially literate non-executive director 
(NED) with knowledge of accounting or financial 
management should serve on the board audit 
committee. Consequently, prior studies (Hayes, 
2014; Badolato, Donelson, & Ege, 2014; 
Nuraddeen Usman Miko & Kamardin, 2015) 
document that, board and members of audit 
committee need financial sophistication. Moreover, 
that, presence of at least one financial or 
accounting expert is associated with a decrease in 
discretionary accruals.  
Abdulmalik and Che (2015) examine the 
relationship between the establishment of risk 
management, corporate governance committees 
(required by CCG, 211) and audit fees, using a 
sample of 94 non-financial listed firms in Nigeria, 
between 2008 and 2013. The study finds corporate 
governance committee to have an insignificant 
relationship with audit fees. Although the study 
could not establish significant relationships, it 
provides evidence of an increase in scope and 
effective monitoring roles of external auditors. 
Similarly, Miko and Kamardin (2016) study the 
development vis-a-vis the challenges of corporate 
governance in the pre and post 1960 independence 
of the Nigeria. The study provided an overall 
assessment of relevant laws governing corporate 
governance mechanisms and concluded that, 
despite the multiplicity of CCG Codes, there is a 
continued non-compliance, corporate failures that 
lead to the bankruptcy of many companies, 
particularly in the financial sector of the economy. 
Similarly, Miko and Kamardin (2015) examined 
the effect of SEC, 2011 changes in the pre and post 
implementation period on the earnings 
management of Consumer Goods Industry in 
Nigeria. Using a sample of 20 listed companies, it 
reveals that the pre-implementation period 
encourages earnings management practices, 
contrary to the post-implementation period. Thus, 
revised CCG 2011, introduced changes that 
effectively enhanced the earnings quality of the 
Nigerian consumer goods industry. Given the 
sample size, it would be difficult to make a 
generalisation of its findings. However, it has 
provided an insight into the impact of those 
changes in that industry which could be extended 
to other industries or the entire listed firms in 
Nigeria.  
Some of the significant changes observed in the 
revised Code of CG 2011 are contained in Sec.4.1, 
p.9 provisions. Where the Board of Directors are 
required to be of sufficient size with a membership 
of not be less than five that should consist of a 
mixture of the executive (ED) and non-executive 
directors (NED) to be chaired by NED. Prior 
literature argue that board size requires expertise 
and experience to handle board related 
responsibilities and [14–19] found a significant 
positive association between board size and 
earnings management. Also, (Xie, Davidson, & 
DaDalt, 2003) found that EM is unlikely in firms 
with larger boards. In line with that, SEC Code 
2011, requires that the NED’s should constitute the 
majority of the Board membership. Moreover, at 
least one (1) of NED should be an independent 
director. The Code emphasised independence of the 
Board from the management. Hence, provides that 
not more than two family members at the same 
time sit on the Board. This study is consistent with 
(Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2007; Magnan & Cormier, 
1997; Erena & Tilahun, 2012; Rubin & Segal, 
2014) that document high proportion of INED’s 
presence on the board improves the quality of 
earnings. Further (Erena & Tilahun, 2012) argue 
found that the larger the percentage of INED the 
lesser the income-increasing accruals. Besides, 
NED is concerned with restraining income 
increasing accruals. 
Furthermore, the two positions of CEO and 
Chairman are required to be separated and held by 
different individuals to allow for checks and 
balances in the discharge of Board’s duties. 
This lent support to the agency and stewardship 
theory (Kim, Al-Shammari, Kim, & Lee, 2009; 
Lin, 2005). Furthermore, the existence of CEO 
duality in an organisation would jeopardise board 
independence, impair its oversight governance role 
(Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014; Dey, Engel, & Liu, 
2011; Elsayed, 2010; Petra, 2005). Therefore, 
independence of the board would be maintained 
and more desirable when the two roles are 
separated (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Other changes 
introduced include mandatory setting up of the 
whistleblowing unit to assist AC in its oversight 
functions, and to establish risk management 
committee, governance committee. While, these 
changes are to take effect and strengthen and 
provide effective CG practices, industries within 
the economy began to set specific corporate 
governance codes. For instance, the banking sector 
has CCG, (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014). The 
National Insurance Commission (Naicom, 2009) 
published Codes of Corporate Governance to guide 
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the Insurance Industry. Also, the (Nigerian 
communication commission, 2014) Code of 
Corporate Governance was issued. Similarly, Code 
of Corporate Governance for licensed pension 
operators (National Pension Commission, 2008) 
was released exclusively for pension fund 
administrators. Thus, resulting to non-compliance 
of the SEC CCG which incapacitated its operation. 
Consequently, with the establishment of Financial 
Reporting Council (FRCN, 2011) that seeks to 
introduce its code of corporate governance, the 
financial/capital market operators, the professionals 
and investors agitate for harmonisation of these 
Codes.    
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
The review of Nigerian SEC CCG 2011 is designed 
to ensure good governance in public companies, 
through the well-established board of directors. 
Moreover, that the BOD’s of each company ought 
to guarantee that the firm’s annual report 
incorporates a CG report that passes on to 
stakeholders, contains an unambiguous information 
on the quality of the company’s CG structures, 
practices, and policies. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is set thus: 
H1: The revised SEC Code of Corporate 
Governance 2011 has significantly improved the 
quality of financial reporting in the Nigerian 
nonfinancial listed firms. 
2.3 Research Design  
The population of the study is all Nigerian listed 
non-financial companies trading on the floor of 
Nigerian Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2014.  
Furthermore, a total of 101 companies emerged as 
the sample size. Multivariate regression using 
pooled panel balanced data was employed in the 
analysis. Thus, (McNichols, 2002) accruals quality 
model was used in predicting FRQ, depicted in 
Equation [1]: 
∆WC= change in working capital, ∆AR= Change 
in account receivables, ∆INV = Change in 
inventory, ∆AP= Change in account payable, 
∆TP= Change in tax payable, ∆Other assets (Net) = 
Change in other assets.  The model is specified 
thus: 
[1] ∆WC_ACC=β0+β1CFOit-1 + β2CFOit + 
β3CFOit+1 + β4∆REV+∆ β5PPEit +εit 
While, CFOit-1= Lag of cash flow from operations, 
CFOit = current year cash flow from operations, 
CFOit+1= following year’s cash flow from 
operations, ∆REV = Change in revenue, PPE= 
Property Plant and Equipment, ε = Residuals, β0= 
Intercept, β1- β5= Coefficients of Independent 
Variable.  
The corporate governance variables were collected 
from the website of SEC and companies’ websites 
as well as hand collected from sample companies 
annual reports respectively. The control variables 
were leverage, profitability, firm age, and firm size. 
Also, a linear regression model was used for 
measuring the power of the association between the 
predictor variables. Whereas, the financial 
reporting quality (FRQ) is the outcome variable 
using abnormal accruals (discretionary) as its 
proxy.   
Below is the model used to test the association 
between the FRQ and explanatory variables in [2]: 
[2] FRQit = β0+ β1BINDit + β2BSit + β3MOSit 
+ β4CEODit+ β5BGDit + β6ACINDit + 
β7ACFEXit + β8ACSOit + β9FAit + β10FSZit + 
β11PRAT + β12LEVit + εit 
2.4 Variables Measurement 
Financial reporting quality=FRQ= Discretionary 
accruals, Board independence=BIND= 
Percentage of the non-executive director or outside 
directors by the total number of directors on the 
board, Board size=BS= Total the number of 
directors’ on the board, Chief executive officer 
Duality=CEDU=Dummy variable indicating “1” if 
CEO is the chairperson of the firm, otherwise “0”, 
Board Gender Diversity=BGD=Proportion of 
female directors to the total number of board 
members, Managerial share ownership=MSOW= 
The percentage of the number of shares owned by 
executive directors divided by the total number of 
company shares, Audit Committee 
independence=ACIND= Measured by “1” with 
presence of at least one independent non-executive 
director on the AC, if otherwise “0”;Audit 
Committee Financial expertise=ACFE= Measured 
by “1” with presence of at least one member with 
financial literacy, if otherwise, “0”; Audit 
Committee share ownership=ACSOW=Proportion 
of shares held by non-executive directors on the 
AC divided by fully paid company’s shares; 
Leverage=LEV= Proportion of total long-term debt 
over a total asset of a firm; Profitability=PRAT= 
Measured by the ratio of profit after tax, to total 
assets; Firm Size=FS= Measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets; Firm Age=FA= Number 
of years of firm’s incorporation  
3.1 Results 
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of 
financial reporting quality for the SEC pre and 
post-CCG, 2011. The pre-period comprise of two 
years (2010-2011) as the period from the effective 
date of implementation and post period of 
equivalent years (2013-2014) as the period after the 
effective date of implementation. Therefore, the 
study used two sample t-statistics with an equal 
variance to examine whether a significant 
difference exists between the mean of the two 
groups (period). Similarly, the groups are 
categorised into group 1=pre-period and denoted 
“0” while group 2= after the revised Code denoted 
“1”. The study anticipates the higher quality of 
earnings during the post-implementation period. 
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Accordingly, Table 4.2 presents the results of the 
two sample means (pre-period has a mean value of 
0.1410, the standard deviation value of 0.4263, 
while the post-period has a mean value of 0.2270, 
the standard deviation value of 0.3954. This 
indicate that the average of 0.1410 of the pre-
period is lower than the average of 0.2270 of the 
post-period, implies that on the average, FRQ 
increases by 9 per cent. Furthermore, the result is 
supported by its significance at 5 percent (t-statistic 
is -2.1004, p-value = 0.0363) level. Thus, the t-
statistics of -2.1004 is sufficient to reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the mean of 
the pre and post-CCG 2011. Consequently, the 
revised code of corporate governance 2011 brought 
about new regulatory changes that effectively 
enhance the quality of financial reporting, hence, 
decreases managerial self-motivation for earnings 
manipulations
.  
Table 3.1. Test of The Differences of DA Between Pre- and Post- CCG, 2011 
Period Mean  SD t-statistics Significance 
Pre-Period 0.1410  0.4263 -2.1004 0.0363** 
Post-Period 0.2270  0.3954   
Difference -0.0859     
Note: Significant levels at ***1% **5% & *10% respectively. SD=standard deviation. 
3.1.1 Diagnostic Tests 
Model specification test was conducted using Ramsey specification test (Ramsey, 1969) that provides p-
value=0.34521 and F-statistics (1.09) which justify the fitness of the study model and correctly specified. Thus 
require no additional variable(s).  Also, Table 3.2 indicates IM Heteroscedasticity Test of χ2 = 29.46, with p-
value=1.0000 that justifies the earlier result and further evidence of constant variance among the error terms. 
Table 3.2 Model Specification, Selection, and Fitness test 
Tests                                                                        χ2 p-value Coefficients 
Ramsey Test  1.09      0.3452 - 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 0.10 0.7494 - 
IM Heteroscedasticity Test 29.46      1.0000 - 
 
Test for Skewness and Kurtosis were conducted, using (Cameron & Trivedi, 1990) decomposition of IM-test. 
The result in Table 3.3 indicates skewness χ2 =7.06 with p-value=0.8538 and kurtosis χ2=1.01 with p-
value=0.3143. Thus, proved the normality of the data. Additional normality test using Mardia (1970) as in Table 
3.3 provides χ2= 2.492 with p-value =0.1145 that proved that the data is normally distributed. This indicate that 
skewness and kurtosis posed no threat to the variables of the study.  
 
Table 3.3 Normality Test 
Tests χ2 p-value  
IM Skewness 
IM Kurtosis 
Mardia Kurtosis 
Henze-Zirkler 
7.06 
1.01 
2.492 
2.522 
0.8538 
0.3143 
0.1145 
0.1123 
 
 
Furthermore, a Chow test was conducted to analyse 
whether intercept and slopes (parameters) of one 
group in the regression model are different from 
other groups. A regression model was estimated 
using interaction method on group variables. The 
null hypothesis for this statistical test stated that the 
before (group 2) and after (group 1) the revised 
Nigerian SEC CCG 2011 have corresponding 
parameters for the selected groups’ variables, 
ACSOW, CEDU, ACIND, BGD and ACFE and 
their intercepts. As such, deviations of the slopes 
and intercepts are not statistically different from 
zero. However, the result of the Chow tests for the 
selected variable (ACSOW, CEDU, ACIND, BGD, 
and ACFE) provides that χ2= 23.47 with p-
value=0.0000, which is significant at 1 percent 
level. The result indicates that the coefficients of 
the explanatory variables are not statistically the 
same between the two groups. It further explained 
that there is evidence of policy change in the SEC 
CCG 2011 that impacted positively on the quality 
of financial reporting in the non-financial listed 
firms in Nigeria. Therefore, the study did not 
support the null hypothesis and concluded that the 
coefficients of these variables are statistically 
different across the two different samples.                       
3.2 Impact of Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms on Pre and Post-CG  
     Code 2011 
Table 3.4 presents a comparison between the 
earnings management (proxy) of FRQ and 
independent variables of the study in the pre and 
post-CCG 2011 period. The analytical comparison 
is aimed at examining whether the revised CCG 
2011 has a significant impact on CG practices in 
enhancing FRQ of the non-financial listed firms in 
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Nigeria compared with the CG code, 2003. Further, 
the analyses would indicate the consistency of the 
results of the two periods (pre and post 2011).   
Table 3.4 shows that the pre-period R
2 
is 
approximately 32 percent, while the post-period R
2
 
is approximately 33 percent, providing evidence of 
an increase in the strength of the model in the CG 
post code 2011 period that fully explained the 
relationship between IV’s and dependent variable 
in the earnings management model. However, both 
models are well fitted by the significance at 1 
percent level. However, the regression results show 
that ACSOW, CEDU, BIND are positive but 
statistically insignificantly associated with earnings 
management during the pre-NGSEC 2011 CG 
Code. Similarly, LEV, MSOW, BIND are positive 
but statistically insignificantly related to EM in the 
post-period. However, LEV, ACFE, FA, FS, and 
MSOW are positive and statistically significantly 
related to EM at 10 percent, 1 percent, 1 percent, 1 
percent, and 5 percent respectively, during the pre-
CCG 2011 period, thereby enhancing EM practices 
as well as reducing the quality of financial 
reporting of the listed firms.  
Accordingly, results in Table 4.4 indicate that 
ACSOW, CEDU and ACFE, are statistically 
positive and significant at the conventional level, 
post-NSEC CG Code 2011. While the control 
variables FA and FS are both positive and 
significantly related with EM. Conversely, ACIND 
appears negative and significant before and after 
the revised CCG 2011, signifying an inverse 
association with earnings management. This 
suggests that the changes in the revised code 
impacted positively on the earnings quality of the 
non-financial listed firms in Nigeria. Hereafter, 
earnings management practices in the non-financial 
listed firms are on the decrease. Therefore, quality 
of earnings is higher in the post-period SEC, CCG, 
2011 than in the pre-period SEC, CCG, 2011. 
Thus, Nigerian SEC, Code of CG 2011 impacted 
positively in providing effective mechanisms for 
monitoring and control of earnings management 
practices in Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
Hence, provided support for the study hypothesis 
H1.
 
Table 3.4 Regression Result of Discretionary Accruals on Pre and Post CCG 2011       
                         Pre-Code 2011  Post-Code 2011  
Variables  Coeff.    t-stat     p-value  Coeff.    t-stat     p-value 
ACSOW 0.053 0.76 0.224 0.032    5.34    0.000***     
LEV 0.001 1.51 0.067* 0.002    0.73    0.233     
MSOW 0.105 1.88 0.031** 0.127    0.78    0.219     
CEDU 0.119 0.87 0.193 0.265    1.74    0.041**     
ACIND -0.240 -2.61 0.005*** -0.185    -2.15    0.017** 
BGD -0.051 -1.00 0.160 -0.076    -1.19    0.118     
BIND 0.286 1.11 0.133 0.137    0.62    0.269      
BS -0.004 -0.42 0.339 -0.018    -1.74    0.041**     
ACFE 0.182 3.17 0.001*** 0.231    4.30    0.000***      
FA 0.007 3.39 0.000*** 0.005    2.16    0.016**      
FS 1.899 7.37 0.000*** 2.159    9.38    0.000***      
PRAT -0.000 -0.11 0.460 -0.019    -0.31    0.380     
         Group observations               202                                       202 
         R-Squared                            0.32                                                                  0.33 
        Sig.                                        0.000***                                                         0.000*** 
 ***, ** and * indicate a significant level at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. Significant at one-
tailed. The dependent variable is financial reporting 
quality, BIND is board independence, CEDU is 
chief executive officer duality, MSOW is directors 
shares ownership, BS is the board size, and BGD is 
the board gender diversity. ACFE is the audit 
committee financial expertise, ACIND is audit 
committee independence, ACSOW is audit 
committee share ownership, LEV leverage (long-
term debt), FS is firm size, FA is firm age, and 
PRAT is the profitability. 
4.1 Conclusion 
The revised SEC Code 2011 was aimed at 
changing the way corporations are managed. 
Though believed to have been mimicked from the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, it has been adjudged to 
have impacted positively in enhancing the 
performance of the board of directors and managers 
in Nigeria. Aside, the proliferation of code of 
corporate governance in Nigeria that lead to its 
weakened and non-compliance. However, the 
regulatory changes introduced in the SEC 2011 
Code, indeed improved the financial reporting 
quality of the non-financial listed firms in Nigeria 
in the post-2011 period.  The findings of this study 
have some implications for both theory and 
practice. Even though the evidence in the 
improvement affected specific board and audit 
committee characteristics, further review is 
required to increase and provide quota for female 
board membership, provide a ceiling for share 
ownership of executive directors. Also, in line with 
the agency theory, audit committee share 
ownership and audit committee financial expertise 
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has proven to be of significance in oversight 
monitoring functions. It requires the mandatory 
disclosure of equity as well as the financial 
expertise of the entire audit committee membership 
not only for the non-executive board members on 
the committee but the three shareholders 
representatives on the audit committee. It would be 
of both investors’ and regulators’ interest to have a 
simplified and harmonised code of corporate 
governance issued by a particular regulatory body, 
which enables immediate implementation and 
compliance. 
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